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Social Protection and Migration in China: 
What Can Protect Migrants from Economic Uncertainty? 
 
Job-related welfare entitlements are common in China. Migrants who do not hold urban 
registration are, in principle, not entitled to job-related welfare even if they are employees in 
the State sector. The official explanation is that rural-urban migrants are allocated access to 
farm land in their rural origins, and hence their welfare rights and security are covered by this 
entitlement to the use of land. In this paper, we look at whether migrants still benefited from 
these opportunities. Second, we investigate whether it is the poor, the unentitled and the 
vulnerable that are excluded from public protection programs. Chinese official social 
protection programs are, like in most western countries, officially designated as being for 
poverty alleviation. However would such programs still be targeted in ways that limit their 
coverage, curtail the range of basic needs provided for and allocate benefits very unequally? 
Thirdly, we explore whether households with favourable productive characteristics are more 
likely to get into social protection programs. Here, the ongoing debate concerning equality of 
opportunity and equality of outcomes has some relevance. Finally, we examine the roles 
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 1. Introduction: issues and context 
 
More than 140 million Chinese people (10% of its population) are classified as 
being a “floating” population, the majority of them rural-to-urban migrants. 
Rural-urban migration in China has been described by the UN Country Team 
(2004) as “perhaps the most powerful force for further reducing poverty in 
China”. However, it is commonly observed that migrants tend to be exposed to 
dangerous environments: living in dreadful conditions in order to save money; 
working in risky occupations or locations in order to obtain higher income.  
Moreover, few of them are covered against uncertainties by either publicly 
managed or commercially organised programmes. How do they protect 
themselves from unforeseen risks? What risk-copying mechanisms do they adopt 
in the unfavourable social environment in which they find themselves?  
 
Using a nationally representative household survey from 2002, we explore whether 
rural-urban migrants are excluded from social protection and how they anticipate 
coping with unforeseen economic shocks. We employ a comparative approach, 
assessing the position of rural-urban migrants in relation to that of their urban or rural 
counterparts. For brevity of exposition, we use the terms “urban residents” and “urban 
households” to refer to those dwelling in urban areas who are not rural-urban 
migrants. The registration system in China is very rigid so that these urban residents 
will have official urban registration (hukou) but rural-urban migrants will still have 
rural registration. 
 
First, we provide some descriptive information – comparing the coverage of social 
protection and job-related welfare benefits among three groups defined by residential 
status: rural, urban and migrant. We further look into the details of how they 
anticipate dealing with unforeseen economic uncertainties by asking to whom they 
would turn to for borrowing fund in order to pay for any unexpected events. 
 
Job-related welfare entitlements are common in China. Migrants who do not hold 
urban registration are, in principle, not entitled to job-related welfare even if they are 
employees in the State sector. The official explanation is that rural-urban migrants are 
allocated access to farm land in their rural origins, and hence their welfare rights and 
  2security are covered by this entitlement to the use of land. However, all individuals 
are allowed and even encouraged to join commercial welfare programmes, in 
particular, medical insurance and pensions, provided they can afford them. 
Employers, both State-owned and private, are requested by law or regulation to 
contribute to all their employees’ welfare schemes in the formal sector. But the 
threshold to enter the formal employment for rural-urban migrants remains high. In 
the 1990s, jobs provided to migrants by official employment agents were usually 
assigned in the formal state sector (Song and Appleton, 2006). We look at whether 
migrants still benefited from these opportunities in 2002.  
 
Second, we investigate whether it is the poor, the unentitled and the vulnerable that 
are excluded from public protection programs. Chinese official social protection 
programs are, like in most western countries, officially designated as being for 
poverty alleviation. However such programs are still targeted in ways that limit their 
coverage, curtail the range of basic needs provided for and allocate benefits very 
unequally. For example, the poor and the vulnerable are not all covered by ‘Low-
income Allowance Scheme’ (known as Dibao) in both rural areas and among the 
rural-urban migrant communities. Medical insurance and old-aged care are still linked 
to employment. Only those who have long-term contracts with their employers are 
able to enter schemes provided by public agents. Migrants or rural residents who are 
not entitled to obtain long-term urban jobs do not benefit from such protections.  
 
Thirdly, we explore whether households with favourable productive characteristics 
are more likely to get into social protection programs. Here, the ongoing debate 
concerning equality of opportunity and equality of outcomes has some relevance (the 
World Bank, 2006). Those in favour of equality of opportunity often advocate 
building-up a market system in which competition provides equal chances for all. 
Believers in equality of outcomes argue that programs should protect the vulnerable 
population. Social protection in China in its current stage is unlikely to satisfy either 
camp. Far from using the market mechanism, most social protection schemes in China 
are provided by the government, public sector employers or local communities and 
are based on employment in public sector. Advocates of equality of outcomes would 
be dissatisfied by the fact that social protection in China is far from universal, being 
instead mainly job-oriented or based on urban residentship (Song, 2006).  
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Finally, we examine the roles social networks or Guanxi (the Chinese term for social 
connections) may play in dealing with economic shocks. Social networks, when 
manipulated for economic purposes, could be regarded as economic resources, and 
hence can be defined as social capital (James Coleman, 1988, 1990). Under decades 
of socialist planning, China suffered from a lack of the market mechanism. This has 
started to change with reform, but marketisation remains incomplete and economic 
resources are still mainly controlled by the state. In such a structure, social 
connections are essential for obtaining resources. Guanxi is used for economic gain 
and often substitutes for market exchanges; for the poor, it can be used for social 
support or social protection. This is especially so when household economic resources 
are not sufficient (Gary Becker, 1981).  In this paper, we ask when there is a lack of 
centrally-funded or publicly-managed welfare programs, are the vulnerable more 
likely to rely upon their social connections for protection than the well-off?   
 
Section 2 provides information about the data we use for the analysis. Section 3 
presents some descriptive statistics. Section 4 outlines the methods used for modelling 
inclusion in social protection. We focus on a range of determinants of inclusion. One 
is household income: whether income increases access to social security or is a 
substitute for it. We also test whether people with more productive characteristics 
have a greater chance of inclusion. Finally, we look at the relation between people’s 
anticipated source of support when coping with economic shocks and whether they 




2. Data  
 
The household surveys used for this paper were conducted in 2003, obtaining 
information on 2002, as part of the Chinese Household Income Project 2002 
(thereafter CHIP 2002). All three main types of Chinese households were surveyed: 
urban households (CHIP Urban Survey 2002), rural households (CHIP Rural Survey 
2002), and rural-urban migrant households (CHIP Migrant Survey 2002). The 
sampling and questionnaires were designed by a team of scholars including the 
  4authors. The surveys were implemented by the National Bureau of Statistics and the 
Research Institute of Economics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. All three 
surveys are intended to be nationally representative either using them separately or 
merging them together (Gustaffson, Li and Sicular, 2007 forthcoming). However, 
there was no adequate sample frame for rural-urban migrants. Migrants were sampled 
from those who resided in cities with addresses, so it is likely that the survey over-
samples settled migrants relative to the more recent or more transitory ones (Appleton 
el at, 2005; Li and Sato, 2006).   
 
The surveys covered all household members including children and elderly. The main 
categories of questions are similar across the three surveys. The information spans 
personal and household characteristics, employment, household production, assets, 
debts, income and consumption. Questions related to social protection and social 
networks were all included in the surveys, although the wording sometimes varied 
across the three kinds of household because of the very large difference in 
circumstances. All information was provided by a respondent, typically the household 
head.  
 
The urban survey contains 7000 households from 11 provinces; the migrant survey 
covers 2000 households with over 5000 migrants from 27 cities in 6 provinces; and 
the rural survey has more than 9000 households from 22 provinces. In the analysis, 
some observations have had to be deleted due to missing values for key variables. The 
main exercise conducted in the paper uses a full sample of over 17,000 Chinese 
households merged from urban, rural and migrant surveys.  
 
 
3. Descriptive information 
 
Migrants face many disadvantages not encountered by urban residents. They often 
lack urban welfare entitlements.  For example, their children would have to pay higher 
fees in order to attend urban schools than their urban counterparts; when food 
subsidies are issued to those who have urban residentship, they are not included; when 
the programmes of ‘unemployment benefit’, ‘low-income allowance’ and pension 
schemes are designed, rural-urban migrants are not considered for inclusion. The only 
  5exceptions to this exclusion would be if migrants secured some social welfare linked 
to their jobs.   
 
Only 5 % of sampled migrant workers, compared with 64% for urban workers, are 
covered by some sort of social protection programmes. Although very small, coverage 
of migrants is much greater than coverage of their rural counterparts - which stands at 
even less than 1 % (Table 1). Of all those who are covered nationally (24% of 
workers), 97% of them are urban residents (Table 2).  
 
Those advocating extending social protection for migrant workers are sometimes seen 
as naïve. The official position is that rural-urban migrants have their access to welfare 
in their rural origins. However, these migrant workers, according to our survey, have 
been in the city for an average of over 7 years. They are fairly settled and a lot of 
them are now living and working with their spouse and children in the city. In recent 
(2007) fieldwork among with migrants in Beijing suburbs, a large number of migrant 
workers said they would go back to rural areas for medical treatment if they fell 
seriously ill. It is apparent that whether migrants could get settled in urban centres or 
not will largely depend on how well integrated they are into the urban system 
economically, socially and culturally. And all this may point to sweeping changes for 
rural Chinese in terms of their land ownership, citizenship, and entitlement to state 
assets. 
 
Since the central government liberalised restrictions on internal migration, ‘allowing’ the 
movement between rural and urban sectors in China, there is no regulation to safeguard 
migrants’ livelihoods. They have to find their own ways of dealing with problems.  
 
One can conceptualise three typical kinds of settlement for rural-urban migrants in 
China. The first type is the “migrant settlement community”. They have emerged in the 
suburbs of big cities like Beijing and Shanghai. Examples of such communities include 
Zhejiang Village, Xinjiang Village, and Henan Village in suburban Beijing. These 
communities are semi-autonomous and inhabited mostly by rural-urban migrants with 
the same provincial origins. These communities are clearly structured with services - 
clinics, transport, shops and restaurants - to cater to their own needs. In this type of 
community, migrant workers live with their employers in an environment where they do 
  6not have many opportunities to contact "outsiders" (Ma and Xiang, 1998). But the 
employers have networks to transfer information about jobs, business and many other 
matters (Song, 2000). The second type of settlement is comparative isolation. Migrants 
live with their fellow-workers and their employers in a corner within a city. These 
migrants do not have many contacts with urban residents and their reference group 
remains their rural fellow-villagers or fellow-migrants. These migrants tend to work in 
manufacturing or on construction sites.  The third type of rural-urban migrant is more 
intermingled with urban residents. Their clients are usually urban residents, or they rent 
accommodations from urban dwellers, or their children, if with them, are mixed with 
urban children in schools or residential sites. This chapter studies these more settled 
migrants, as they are likely to stay on in cities, and are resourceful of competing or co-
existing with the entitled urban residents.  With all three types of rural-urban migrants, 
social protection coverage against economic uncertainty has been deficient.  
 
The living arrangements, in many ways, are not associated with social security 
coverage. Job-security in China, since the economic reform, has become the most 
secured protection. And obtaining jobs in the formal or State sector is the most likely 
route for migrants to obtain social protection. Entitlement to urban jobs implies 
welfare entitlement in China. In the 1990s, many types of jobs were not available for 
rural-urban migrants (whose hukou are registered in rural areas), while most welfare 
provisions were linked to those jobs (Knight and Song, 2005). This has not been 
reversed even though it has not openly mentioned since the current government came 
to power. The root, therefore, of the exclusion of rural-urban migrants from the 
current social protection system is, by and large, embedded in urban job-entitlements. 
However, according to our survey (Table 3), job opportunities have not kept pace with 
the numbers of rural-urban migrants. In 1999, 35% of the sampled migrant workers 
obtained their jobs from market competition; and this has fallen to 30% in 2002. 
Government job-centres have stopped helping migrant workers since 1999; less than 
1% of migrant workers in 2002 got their jobs from such agents. We note that it is jobs 
introduced by government agents that are more likely to provide migrants with social 
protection coverage. 35% of sampled migrant workers received a pension package; 
30% were covered by medical insurance and 30% could claim unemployment benefit 
(Table 4). The proportion of migrants’ using their guanxi networks to find jobs 
remained at a similar level between 1999 and 2002. But the proportion of migrants 
  7who are in self-employment is 8 percentage points higher. More and more migrants 
come to cities and create their own work. This raises the issue of whether they can 
protect themselves from risk. 
 
 
4. Methods and modelling specification 
 
The main purpose of this paper is to examine the determinants of inclusion in the 
social protection programs available to Chinese households. A recent study by the 
World Bank researchers pioneered an investigation into social protection and 
expanded the conventional concept into “the double role of risk management 
instruments—protecting basic livelihoods as well as promoting risk taking” 
(Holzmann and Jørgensen, 2001). Unfortunately, the data used here does not 
sufficiently capture all dimensions of risk-taking. Nor did it measure household 
shocks, such as those studied by Dercon et al (2004, 2005). We do not yet have access 
to nationally representative longitudinal data that would be ideal for such a study. 
Consequently, we confine ourselves to analyzing the coverage of social protection 
programs. The dependent variable is a dummy variable for whether the individual is 
included in any publicly-funded or managed social security program. These programs 
are defined as medical insurance (for all three surveys) together with pensions and 
unemployment benefits for the urban and migrant samples only. Unemployment 
benefits and state pensions are typically not available to rural residents and so were 
not inquired about in the rural survey.  
 
Social protection and social support have a role given uncertainty over health and 
incomes. We model whether a household i is covered by publicly funded social 
protection program (SPi = 1) or not (SP i = 0) using a probit: 
SP*i   =   α ’ Q i  +  U i     where   U i ~ N (0,1)                            
Pr (SPi = 1)   =   Pr (SP*i > 0)  =  Φ(α ’ Qi  )    (1) 
 
In Equation 1, Qi is a vector of explanatory variables and α  a vector of associated 
coefficients. Among the explanatory variables are  
(1) household income per capita (logged); 
  8(2) logged household income per capita (predicted); 
(3) dummy variables to define whether observations are urban, rural or migrant 
households; 
(4)   household stock of social capital, proxied by dummy variables for self-
assessed sources for social support; 
(5) household stock of human capital, proxied by the respondent’s education in 
years and their self-assessed health status; 
(6) household stock of political capital, proxied by the respondent’s Communist 
Party membership; 
(7) personal characteristics including sex and age; 
(8) marital status; and 
(9) province dummy variables 
 
There are several methodological issues that arise from this model. Household income 
variable may be endogenous, since it includes public transfers from social protection 
(medical insurance and safety nets). Consequently, we employ a two-stage probit 
model, use predicted rather than actual log income as an explanatory variable. The 
dummy for being a migrant may also be endogenous due to the selectivity of 
migration.   
 
 
5. Results:  examining the determinants of social protection exclusion 
 
Table 6 presents a binary probit model for whether adults are included in publicly 
funded social safety programs. The actual proportion of adults who are included is 
28%, although due to the non-linearity of the probit model, it predicts a smaller mean 
proportion (10%) at the mean of the explanatory variables. Two variants of the model 
are estimated - one with actual household income per capita as an explanatory 
variable; another with that variable instrumented by household income in the previous 
year. The models have a high goodness of fit: the pseudo R
2 for the first model is 
56%, and for the second model is 53%.  
 
In the first variant of model (1
st Column Table 6), using actual income, the marginal 
effect of logged income on the probability of being included in a social protection 
  9scheme is 8%. This implies that doubling household income would raise the predicted 
probability of being included by 8 percentage points. Compared with urban 
individuals and controlling for other determinants, rural residents are 34 percentage 
points and rural-urban migrants 8 percentage points less likely to be covered by social 
protection. One extra year of education for household heads would increase the 
likelihood of being protected by half a percentage point. Political status, proxied by 
whether household heads are Communist Party members, also has a positive and 
significant effect on inclusion in social protection. Having a Party member as 
household head means it is 3.5 percentage points more likely that they will be socially 
protected, ceteris paribus. Working in the State sector has a very large impact on the 
probability of social protection - raising it by eight percentage points. Being 
unemployed, other things are equal, reduces the chance of getting protection by 5 
percentage points. This reflects the loss of access to work-unit based entitlements. 
Men are 2% less than women to be protected and age has statistically insignificant 
effects. In the model we also test whether marital status has any impacts on social 
protection. Married couples may be more security-mined and it would be more likely 
for this kind of households to seek for extra certainty (Song, 1999). Indeed, in our 
model, we find that being married raises the probability of being included in social 
protection by three percentage points.  
 
One of the assumptions we wish to test is whether anticipated social support from 
informal arrangements is a good substitute for publicly funded social insurance. The 
data allows us to include such information in the model. It includes a question asking 
what source of financial assistance households would turn to if they had economic 
difficulties. Three responses were coded: (1) social networks - relatives, friends, and 
etc); (2) institutional support - work units, local communities and banks; and (3) not 
using any particular social connection, which mostly can be interpreted as being self-
sufficient. However, when we put entered dummy variables for these responses into 
the model (category 1 is omitted as the default), they were statistically insignificant, 
with small marginal effects.   
 
The second variant of the model presented in Table 5 allows for the possible 
endogeneity of income with respect to social protection. This greatly increases the 
marginal effect of doubling income from 8% to 42%. In general terms, the absolute 
  10size and significance of the other explanatory variables are greatly reduced if income 
is treated as endogenous. Only location and public sector employment remain 
significant at conventional levels. If we accept the results of the second variant of the 
model, this implies household income has the utmost impact on inclusion of social 
protection programs. The higher the households’ income, the more likely for them to 
be covered by publicly funded or managed safety nets. The productive characteristics 
of the labour force may indirectly - via income generation - increase the likelihood of 
being covered by social protection, but not have a significant direct effect. 
 
Given that income can be singled out as the most important factor for determining 
social protection, migrants’ relentless pursuit of income seems easily understandable. 
With the same national household survey dataset, researchers reported from an 
exercise modelling on household income (an OLS regression with logged household 
income per capita as the dependent variable), after controlling for all other 
explanatory variables, the coefficient on the rural dummy is - 1.178 and that on the 
migrant dummy is -0.694. In other words, household income per capita is estimated to 
be 69% lower for rural residents than for urban ones, controlling for other observed 
characteristics
1. Migrant households are predicted to earn more than their rural 
counterparts, ceteris paribus, but still earn 50% less than urban households. Urban 
households therefore receive significant income advantages not attributable to their 
observed human capital (education, health or experience) (Song and Appleton, 2007). 
 
Rural-urban migrants are less likely to get social protection funded or managed by 
public agents. If they had remained residing in their rural origins, traditional methods 
of social support from the extended family or fellow villagers could provide some 
alternative for protection. When away from home, they would be expected to establish 
their own protection system for coping with adverse shocks. Having a closely-knit 
network could provide not only economic benefits but also emotional protection. In 
Table 6, however, the sources of anticipated methods to cope with economic risks are 
not associated with the dependent variable – whether they are included in social 
protection schemes. To explore differences in how people anticipate coping with 
future risks differ and what factors determine these differences would be of interest.  
                                                           
1 This is calculated using the exp(β)-1 where β is the coefficient on an explanatory variable. 
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According to Song and Appleton (2007), who have employed a multi-nomial logit 
model on anticipated source for coping with future risks, both migrants and rural 
residents are much more likely to rely on self-sufficiency in the event of an adverse 
economic shock. They are much less likely to rely on social networks (83-90 
percentage points less likely), but also less inclined to use institutional agents. Urban 
residents are more likely to practice Guanxi for economic gains. High income per 
capita tends to increase the likelihood of households relying on their own resources to 
cope with shocks. Inclusion in social protection schemes is associated with reduced 
self-sufficiency - raising use of both institutional agents and social networks by 




In this paper, we have used a nationally representative household survey from 2002 to 
analyse how social protection varies between three different groups: urban residents, 
rural residents and rural-urban migrants. We began by comparing the level of social 
protection of these three groups.  Urban residents unsurprisingly came out best in 
terms of safety-net coverage, although only less than a quarter of China’s working 
population was in fact protected. Job opportunities for rural-urban migrants in 2002 
do not seem to have improved, with more choosing self-employment. Ceteris paribus, 
this trend would worsen access to social protection, which is typically employment-
related in urban China.  
 
That inclusion in state social protection schemes is very concentrated on urban 
residents is not surprising. When modelling access to formal social protection 
schemes, we found differences by residence status persisted after controlling for 
observable factors such as personal characteristics. Perversely, although social 
protection was intended to support the poor and vulnerable, household income had a 
positive effect on access. Even after controlling for residence, more affluent 
households were more likely to be covered by social protection schemes.  
 
Finally, we have to answer what can protect migrants from economic risks. Looking 
at who households intended to turn to in the event of adverse economic shocks, we 
  12realised that they mainly have to rely on themselves. Like rural households, migrants 
who appear reliant on self-sufficiency, which could mean a simple ‘not-sufficiency’. 
They are trying their luck as their ancestors did in traditional China. For this, they 
would have to build up their savings by relentless making money. Only coverage by 
social protection would reduce the likelihood of households relying on self-
sufficiency, but such protection largely excludes migrant households. Urban residents 
are more likely to have to their social networks or to institutional agencies to turn to 
for help. This finding, together with the regressive distribution of social protection, 
provides some support for the case for further welfare reform to assist rural 
households and migrants in coping with economic uncertainties.  
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Table 1 





Rural Migrant Urban National
Included in Social Protection 
Programs (unit=number) 
15 98 4204    4317
% covered in the type of 
household  
  0.16   4.92      64.27  24.34
Number of cases  
 
9,200 1,992 6,541 17,733
 
Note:  
Social protection is defined in the paper as whether households are included in social 














Rural Migrant Urban National
% covered in the full sample  
 
  0.35   2.27      97.38  100
Number of cases  
 
9,200 1,992 6,541 17,733
 
Note:  
Social protection is defined in the paper as whether households are included in social 
safety nets provided by both publicly and commercially funded or managed programs.  
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Table 3 
Anticipated Sources of Economic Resources in Dealing with Uncertainties (%) 
 
Household type   Rural  Migrant Urban  National
Using private networks   53.6 85.3 69.9  63.2
Relying on institutional 
assistance  
10.6 11.8 4.1 8.4
Self-sufficient   35.8 2.9 26.0  28.5
Number of cases  
 






Comparing Job-search Methods between Migrants in 1999 and 2002 
1999 and 2002 CASS Surveys 
(Percentage)  
 
Current job-seeking method:  Migrant (1999)  Migrant (2002) 
Getting jobs from market 
competition 
35.02 30.01 
Getting jobs from government agent    2.83     0.60 
Getting jobs from social networks  25.98  26.41 
Self-employed   34.57  42.99 
Other (non-specified)     1.6     0.0 
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Table 5 
Safety Net Coverage by Job-search Method (%) 
 
 






From government agent  35.00  30.00  30.00 
Market competition   6.07   4.26   2.38 
Social network   4.40   2.71   1.69 
Self-employed    3.24   1.81   0.69 
% of recipients to the 
sample as a whole 
 4.77   2.98   1.55 
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Probit model for Inclusion in Social Protection: 
All Sampled Households (2002 CHIP Surveys) 
 
Variable  Marginal effects  
(Robust standard error) 




Log (household income per 
capita) 
 0.0813   (0.0065)***      |  
Log (predicted household 
income per capita) 
     0.4233    (0.0795)***    
Rural household  -0.3478    (0.0220)***   -0.2811     (0.0383)***     
Migrant household  -0.0822    (0.0068)***   -0.0754     (0.0186)***     
Anticipate using institutional 
resources in event of adverse 
shock 
-0.0015    (0.0098)      -0.0029     (0.0127)  
Anticipate being self-
sufficient in event of adverse 
shock  
 0.0054     (0.0053)        0.0042     (0.0072)  
Communist Party member   0.0350     (0.0063)***    0.0129     (0.0104)  
Education in year   0.0051     (0.0009)***        0.0029     (0.0019)    
Unemployed  -0.0511     (0.0069)***       -0.0177     (0.0240)  
Working in State Sector    0.0866    (0.0105)***      0.0235     (0.0153) *    
Male     0.0174    (0.0043)***       0.0011     (0.0060)   
Married   -0.0301    (0.0135) ***       0.0050     (0.0161)  
Age    0.0008     (0.00123)     0.0005     (0.0016)     
Age 
2   8.48e-06  (0.0000)       2.87e-06  (0.0000)    
    
Mean proportion protected    0.2786     
Predicted proportion (at mean 
of explanatory variables). 
  0.0666        0.1000      
Pseudo  R
2   0.5565    0.5282 
Wald Statistic  2748.56  3575.44 
Number of observations  14,897  14,432 
                
Dependent variable: 0 = excluded from social protection; 1= included 
 
Notes: 
(1) Robust standard errors are in brackets. *** denotes statistics significance at 1% level, 
and %% at less than 5% level. 
(2) Omitted dummy variables are urban households, social support from closely-nit 
networks, not Communist Party member and not in marriage. Province dummy 
variables are included in both models but not presented for brevity.    
(3) In the second model, predicted household income per capita is instrumented with the 
previous year’s income as the identifying instrument.  
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